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In the leader election problem, n players wish to elect a random leader. The
difficulty is that some coalition of players may conspire to elect one of its
own members. We adopt the perfect information model: all communication is
by broadcast, and the bad players have unlimited computational power. Pro-
tocols proceed in rounds: although players are synchronized between rounds,
within each round the bad players may wait to see the inputs of the good
players. A protocol is called resilient if a good leader is elected with proba-
bility bounded away from 0. We give a simple, constructive leader election
protocol that is resilient against coalitions of size bn, for any b < 1/2. Our
protocol takes log* n+O(1) rounds, each player sending at most log n bits
per round. For any constant k, our protocol can be modified to take k
rounds and offer resilience against coalitions of size en/(log (k) n)3, were e is a
small enough constant and log(k) denotes the logarithm iterated k times. This
is constructive for k \ 3. The primary component of the above protocols is a
new collective sampling protocol: for a set S of large enough (polynomial)
size, this protocol generates an element s ¥ S in a single round so that for any
subset T … S, Pr[s ¥ T] [ |T| |S|a (1−b) for a constant a > 0. © 2001 Elsevier
Science (USA)
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is about three related problems that arise naturally in the study of
distributed computing: leader election, collective sampling, and collective coin-
flipping. We begin with a discussion of coin-flipping, since this is perhaps the most
basic of the three.
In a distributed computing environment common random bits may be required.
Collective coin-flipping is the problem of obtaining such bits if some processors are
faulty. If people are behind the processors, the faults may be malicious; this is the
case, for example, when coin flips are needed to gamble over the Internet [HS97].
Following Ben-Or and Linial [BL90], we assume that faults may be malicious, that
all communication is by broadcast, and that the sender of every message is known
with certainty. Processors may broadcast messages simultaneously.
The simplest method for n processors, called players, to generate a collective
random bit is as follows. A suitable function f: {0, 1}nQ {0, 1} is chosen in
advance. Then each player broadcasts a random ri ¥ {0, 1}, and the collective
random bit is taken to be r=f(r1, ..., rn).
We allow a subset B … [n] of bad players to collude to bias the resulting bit. In
particular, they may not choose their ri’s randomly. One obtains different models
depending on whether the distributed environment is synchronous and whether
the bad players’ computational power is limited. This paper focuses on the most
difficult of these possibilities.
In a synchronous environment, the players cannot see other players’ choices for
ri. Thus, Parity will output a perfectly unbiased bit if even one player is honest. On
the other hand, our model assumes an asynchronous environment: although mes-
sages are supposed to be sent in parallel, they may be sent in any order. Therefore,
the bad players may wait to see the honest players’ choices before they act. In this
case, Parity is foiled by just one bad player.
If the bad players’ computational power is restricted to polynomial-time, then the
players can use cryptography to communicate with each other privately (assuming
sufficiently strong cryptography). The resulting problem is related to Byzantine
agreement. To avoid relying on unproven assumptions and to obtain the strongest
possible results, our model allows unlimited computational power for the bad
players. This is called the perfect information model, and was first introduced in the
context of collective coin-flipping by Ben-Or and Linial [BL90].
A function f is called resilient if it gives rise to a robust coin-flipping protocol:
Definition 1. A family of functions fn: {0, 1}nQ {0, 1}, n=1, 2, ..., is called
b(n)-resilient if there exists c > 0 such that for all n and B ı [n] with |B| [ b(n),
regardless of the strategy of the players in B,
c [ Pr[fn(r1, ..., rn)=1] [ 1− c.
Thus, for example, Majority is c`n-resilient, for any positive c. The most resilient
functions known were shown to exist by Ajtai and Linial (there are non-construc-
tive parts to their proof):
Theorem 1 [AL93]. There exists a family of functions which is en/log2 n-
resilient, for a small enough positive constant e.
There is also a lower bound:
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Theorem 2 [KKL88]. If b(n)=w(n/log n), then no family of functions is
b(n)-resilient.
In order to achieve larger resilience, we enrich the class of protocols under con-
sideration, allowing the protocols to last many rounds and allowing players to send
many bits in each round. Each round is asynchronous: within a round, the bad
players may wait to see the communication of the good players. Between rounds,
the processors are synchronized. The notion of resilience is extended in a natural
way to this multi-round scenario.
We now broaden the discussion to include leader election protocols. In this case,
the protocol is supposed to pick a uniformly random leader among the n proces-
sors. Resilience is then defined as follows:
Definition 2. A leader election protocol is called b(n)-resilient if there is a
constant c < 1 which upper bounds the probability that any coalition of size b(n)
can elect one of its own members.
Note that if there is a k-round leader election protocol, then there is a k+1-
round coin-flipping protocol with the same resilience: in the last round the leader
may flip the coin.
One example of a leader election protocol is the baton passing protocol. Initially,
player 1 holds the baton. In each round, the player holding the baton passes it to a
player who has not yet held the baton. The last player to hold the baton is called
the leader. Saks [Sak89] showed that if the honest players toss the baton randomly
(among those players who have not yet touched the baton), this protocol is en/log n-
resilient for a small enough positive constant e. Saks also observed that no
protocol can be [n/2]-resilient (see [BN] for a proof).
The last decade has witnessed remarkable improvement in our understanding of
this problem, culminating in constructive, O(log n)-round protocols which are
bn-resilient [ORV94, Zuc97] for any fixed b < 1/2. The historical summary in
Fig. 1 briefly charts this progress. We present a constructive leader election proto-
col requiring only log* n+O(1) rounds to achieve bn-resilience, for any b < 1/2.
This protocol can be modified to yield improved constant round protocols, offering
en/(log (k) n)3-resilience in k rounds for a small enough constant e. This is construc-
tive for k \ 3.
FIG. 1. Historical summary.
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These protocols rely on a new protocol for collective sampling. The collective
sampling problem is a generalization of the problems discussed above: the objective
of a collective sampling protocol for S is to produce an element s ¥ S in a suitably
robust fashion. Typically, the set S varies with the number of players (as in the
leader election problem), and a collective sampling protocol for S guarantees that
for every target subset T … S, Pr[s ¥ T] is suitably small.
Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial [GGL91] introduced the collective sampling
problem, and demonstrated a collective sampling protocol for which
Pr[s ¥ T] [ (|T|/|S|)1−cm(B)
where m(B) is the fraction of corrupt players and c > 0 is some constant. This is
optimal up to the constant c. Note that such a bound on Pr[s ¥ T] gives a
‘‘negligibility property’’: if |T|/|S|=o(1) then Pr[s ¥ T]=o(1).
Their protocol has a couple of disadvantages. First, m(B) has to be a small
enough constant (less than 1/c). Second, their protocol takes many rounds, con-
sisting of log |S| metarounds where each metaround consists of a polynomial
number of sequential calls to a collective coin-flipping subroutine.
Here we remove these disadvantages, and give a one-round protocol achieving
Pr[s ¥ T] [ |T| |S|−a(1−m(B))
for some a > 0 and large enough polynomial |S|. The running time is polynomial in
|S|, unless |S| \ 2n, in which case a simple algorithm running in time linear in log |S|
will suffice. Although our bound on Pr[s ¥ T] is useful for any m(B) < 1, it doesn’t
yield the negligibility property. Observe, however, that it is unrealistic to achieve
their bound in one-round: if this were possible, then taking |T|=1 and |S|=2
would yield a one round collective coin-flipping protocol.
We note that subsequent to our work, Feige [Fei] gave a simpler leader election
protocol requiring the same number of rounds as ours. Although he discusses
sampling under the term selection, his work does not appear to offer a comparable
collective sampling protocol.
Finally, we remark that if the bad players’ computational power were restricted
to polynomial-time, and if sufficiently strong cryptography exists, then the
Byzantine agreement protocol of Feldman and Micali [FM97] may be used to
achieve an N(n−1)/3M-resilient leader election protocol that takes a constant
number of expected rounds.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the necessary back-
ground; in Section 3 we present the one-round collective sampling protocol; in
Section 4 we present the leader election protocol; and in Section 5 we present
constant-round variants of these protocols.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We denote the set {1, ..., n} by [n]. The logarithm base 2 is denoted log n and
the natural logarithm ln n. In general, we ignore rounding errors when their effect is
insignificant.
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Two combinatorial constructions shall be instrumental in the development of our
protocol: a ‘‘balanced’’ polylogarithmic set system and a hitting set for combina-
torial rectangles. These are introduced below in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2. As a
final preparatory step, Section 2.3 is devoted to bounding a class of recurrence
relations related to the protocol.
2.1. Balanced Set Systems and Committee Sampling via Extractors
A paradigm appearing frequently in the leader election literature is the recursive
application of ‘‘committee’’ selection. Briefly, the description of the n-player proto-
col includes a collection of (overlapping) committees of the n players, each of size
nŒ° n. A collective sampling protocol is invoked to select a committee from this
collection, which removes from consideration all players but those in the selected
committee. The remaining players then carry out the nŒ-player protocol to elect the
final leader. Assuming that some b fraction of the players are corrupt, a natural
property to desire on the part of this family of committees is that regardless of
which subset of the players are corrupt, very few of the committees have much
more than a b fraction of corrupt members. If the sampling protocol we apply is
suitably robust, we can then recurse on an appropriately balanced collection of
players. Specifically, the committees we use shall have the properties outlined in
Definition 4, below.
Definition 3. A subset B ı [n] has density m(B)=|B|/n. A subset C ı [n] is
called B-saturated if |C 5 B| \ (m(B)+1/log n) |C|.
Definition 4. Cn … 2[n] is a balanced set system if
1. -C ¥ Cn, |C|=(log n)O(1),
2. for any B …X, the number of B-saturated committees is O(n1.1).
As one would expect, a random collection of nO(1) such sets can easily be shown
to satisfy the above properties with high probability, proving existence. We need an
explicit construction, which is supplied by extractor constructions (see [Nis96] for a
survey of extractors and their applications). We restate the extractor construction
we need in our framework, making use of the observation that if there is a balanced
set system of size f(n) and g(n) [ f(n), then there is one of size g(n).
Theorem 3 [Zuc97]. For all polynomial-time computable functions g: NQN
with g(n)=nO(1), there is a polynomial-time constructible family of balanced set
systems of size g(n).
2.2. Hitting Sets for Combinatorial Rectangles
For a set S (such as the set of committees described above), our collective sampl-
ing protocol for S associates elements of S with members of a sparse ‘‘hitting set’’
for combinatorial rectangles, defined below.
Definition 5. A combinatorial rectangle R in [a]d is a cross product R=
R1× · · · ×Rd, with each Ri … [a]. The volume of such a set is vol(R)=a−d ·<i |Ri |.
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Definition 6. An (a, d, d)-hitting set is a set H … [a]d which intersects every
combinatorial rectangle of volume at least d. When the universe is understood, such
a set will be referred to as an d-hitting set.
An easy probabilistic proof shows that there exist (a, d, d)-hitting sets of size
Kln(2) ad/dL. A constructive solution is offered by Linial et al., who prove the
following theorem:
Theorem 4 [LLSZ97]. There exists an (a, d, d)-hitting set of cardinality
poly(log(d) a/d) constructible in time poly(ad/d).
2.3. A Lemma about Poly-logarithmic Decay
In order to avoid logarithms of negative numbers, we define iterated logarithms
as follows. For n \ 1 and k ¥N,
log (k) n=˛1 if log(k−1) n < 2,
log(log(k−1) n) otherwise,
with log (0) n=n. Then, for n \ 1, define log*(n) to be the smallest natural number k
for which log (k) n=1. We will need the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Let T: NQN be a function given by the recurrence relation:
T(n)=˛ t0 for n [ nT,
1+T(f(n)) for n > nT,
for a function f=(log n)O(1) and constants t0 and nT. Then T(n) < log* n+O(1).
Proof. Choose c so that f(n) < N(log n)cM for all sufficiently large n. For
convenience, assume that c > 2. Then, defining S(n) as
S(n)=˛ s0 for n [ nS,
1+S(N(log n)cM) for n > nS,
there is an appropriate choice of the constants nS and s0 so that S is well defined
and, for all n ¥N, T(n) [ S(n). For convenience assume that nS > c4c. Now, for
n \ 1 and k ¥N define L (k)(n) so that
L (k)(n)=˛1 if L (k−1)(n) < 2,
N(log L (k−1)(n))cM otherwise,
with L (0)(n)=n. Then S(n)=s0+L*(n), where L*(n) is the smallest k for which
L (k)(n) [ nS. We prove by induction on k that L (k)(n) [ (c4 log (k) n)c. The base case
k=0 is immediate. Assuming the inequality for L (k)(n), we have
L (k+1)(n)=N(log L (k)(n))cM [ [c log(c4 log(k) n)]c
=(4c log c+c log(k+1) n)c [ (c4 log (k+1) n)c,
since c > 2. Recalling that ns > c4c, the lemma follows. L
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3. A ONE ROUND COLLECTIVE SAMPLING PROTOCOL
We now turn our attention to the collective sampling problem. The sampling
protocol below is the combinatorial core of the leader election protocol of
Section 4.
Theorem 6. There is a constant c > 0 such that for any S of size at least nc there
is a one round collective sampling protocol for S so that for all T … S,
Pr[s ¥ T] [ |T| |S|−(1−m(B))/c.
Furthermore, this protocol runs in time polynomial in |S| and n. When |S| \ 2n a naive
protocol can achieve this bound, with c [ 2, in time linear in log |S|.
Proof. First we describe the naive protocol for large |S|. Suppose |S|=2 sn for
some integer s. Then associate S with {0, 1} sn, have each player output s random
bits, and concatenate the bits of the players. It is easy to check that this achieves the
desired bound with c=1. In case 2 sn < |S| < 2 (s+1) n we may have some players flip s
bits and others flip s+1; this achieves the bound for c=1+m(B)/s.
We now turn to the more difficult case of smaller S. Assume that |S| < 2n. Our
starting idea is due to [ORV94]: each player eliminates a random G((log |S|)/n)
fraction of S. The lexicographically least element (say) that remains is the selected
element. This protocol ensures that with high probability no element of T remains.
Unfortunately, this would allow the bad players to eliminate every element of S.
Our key idea is to restrict the possible subsets of S that a player may eliminate.
Below we give a method for this which prevents the players from eliminating all of S.
We shall associate S with the elements of a d-hitting set H in [a]n, for
appropriately selected d > 0 and a. For an element s ¥ S, we let hF(s) ¥H denote the
element of H associated with s. With such an association, the protocol proceeds as
follows. Each player i broadcasts a random ri ¥ [a], which removes from consid-
eration all elements s ¥ S for which h(s)i=ri. The lexicographically least element in
R={s: -i, h(s)i ] ri}
is then the element selected from S.
Fixing a subset T of S, we must then insure that
1. if |T| is small enough, then the probability that T 5 R ]” is small, and
2. R is non-empty.
Observe that if
d [ 11−1
a
2n=vol({vF ¥ [a]n : -i, vi ] ri}),
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then H contains an element of any set of form {vF ¥ [a]n : -i, vi ] ri}, so that item 2
is guaranteed. Focusing now on item 1, notice that for any t ¥ T,
Pr[t ¥ R] [ 11−1
a
2 (1−m(B)) n
since the honest players select their ri uniformly in [a].
The statement of the theorem now follows by judicious selection of the param-
eters a and d. Specifically, we shall be interested in the case when d < 1/n and a < n,
so that the association of S with H requires that |S| \ d−c \ poly(ad−1 log n) for a
constant c determined by Theorem 4. Assume that c \ 2. Satisfaction of item 2
above demands that d [ (1− 1a )
n. So assign
|S|−
1
c=d=11−1
a
2n. (1)
Observe now that
Pr[,t ¥ T 5 R] [ |T| 11−1
a
2 (1−m(B)) n [ |T| |S| −(1−m(B))c ,
as desired. Finally, we observe that an acceptable value of a is induced by Eq. (1):
a−1=1−d
1
n=1−e
ln d
n=1−e
−ln |S|
cn
so that
a−1 >
ln |S|
cn
−
1
2
1 ln |S|
cn
22=w 11
n
2
and hence a=o(n) (recall that |S| \ n); similarly, since |S| < 2n,
a−1 <
ln |S|
cn
[
ln 2
c
and hence a > 2 (recall that c \ 2), as desired. L
4. THE LEADER ELECTION PROTOCOL
The protocol we present below is recursive, each step discarding all but a small
committee of players. The base case invokes the following result of Boppana and
Narayanan:
Theorem 7 [BN]. For every b < 12 , there is a leader election protocol resilient
against coalitions of size bn.
Although this is non-constructive in general, we need the result only for a specific
(constant) value n0 so that the protocol can, of course, be found by exhaustive
search (trying all possible protocols and strategies for the bad players). Feige [Fei] has
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observed that since n0 is constant, at this stage one can in fact use a simple one-
round protocol in lieu of Theorem 7.
Our protocol selects a committee of size (log n)O(1) in a single round, so we focus
on functions
fn: XnQ {C … [n] : |C| [ (log n)O(n)}
where X is some appropriately selected domain.
Lemma 8. For all b < 1, there is a polynomial-time computable family of
functions
fn: XnQ {C … [n] : |C| [ (log n)O(1)}
so that for any set B … [n] of size at most bn, the probability that for a random
setting of the variables outside B, some setting of the variables of B produces a
B-saturated committee f(x1, ..., xn) is at most O(1/n). The set X can be taken to be
{0, 1} log n.
Proof. Let cs be the constant guaranteed by Theorem 6 and set c > (2 · 1)
cs
1−b .
From Theorem 3, there is a balanced set system C of subsets of [n] of size nc.
Applying the one round collective sampling protocol of Theorem 6, the probability
that a B-saturated committee is selected is at most
O(n1 · 1)(n−
c(1−b)
cs )=o 11
n
2
by our choice of c. L
Theorem 9. For all b < 12 , there is a log* n+O(1) round leader election protocol
resilient against coalitions of size bn.
Proof. We apply Lemma 8 recursively until the resulting number of players is at
most n0, a suitable constant to be chosen later. We then apply Theorem 7. Lemma 5
shows that this protocol does indeed terminate in log* n+O(1) rounds.
Fix b < 12 . There are two types of error to control. First, there is bˆ(n), the
maximum possible resulting fraction of bad players when the protocol begins with n
players (bn of which are corrupt), assuming only unsaturated committees were
chosen at each step. Then
bˆ(n) [ bˆ((log n)O(1))+1/log n.
By choosing n0 large enough, we can ensure that bˆ(n) is bounded away from
1
2 for
all n, which is what we need to apply Theorem 7.
Second, there is the error E(n) that, with n starting players, a B-saturated
committee is chosen somewhere in the recursion. This error satisfies
E(n) [ E((log n)O(1))+O(1/n).
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This can be made arbitrarily small by choosing n0 large enough. In fact, we only
need it to be less than 1, since we ensure that conditional on reaching n0 players
with all unsaturated committees, there is a constant probability that the protocol
given by Theorem 7 will select a good leader. L
5. CONSTANT ROUND PROTOCOLS
The requirement that the fraction of corrupt players, b, be (a constant) less than
1/2 manifests itself only in the base case of the above leader election protocol.
Indeed, the recursive committee selection process (i.e. Lemma 8) is well behaved
for any b < 1. Returning momentarily to the collective sampling problem, this
observation induces a k-round collective sampling protocol, for k=O(1), with
Pr[s ¥ T] [ |T| |S|
−(1−b−o(1))
cŒ
assuming that |S| \ (log(k−1) n)cŒ for an appropriate constant cŒ > 0 (recall that the
protocol of Section 3 required that |S| > nc). Sampling in a set of this size is
achieved by selecting, in k−1 rounds, a committee C of players for which with high
probability
• |C 5 B||C| < m(B)+o(
1
log n), and
• |C| [ |S|
1
c, where c is the constant of Theorem 6.
and then applying the protocol of Section 3. The error in this protocol is dominated
by the error in the last round.
In similar fashion, coupling Lemma 8 with the en/(log n)2-resilient functions of
Ajtai–Linial (see Theorem 1, above), we now present k-round leader election
protocols which, for small enough ek > 0, are ekn/(log(k) n)3-resilient.
5.1. The Functions of Ajtai–Linial and Sub-linear Coalitions
Definition 7. Let f: {0, 1}nQ {0, 1} be a boolean function on variables
{x1, ..., xn}. The influence of a set S ı {x1, ..., xn} on f, written If(S), is the prob-
ability that the function is undetermined by a random setting of the variables
outside S.
Ajtai and Linial [AL93] have shown the existence of a family of functions for
which the influence of any set of en/(log n)2 variables is O(e). As the base case of
our constant round constructions, we need a family of functions for which the
influence of any set of en/(log n)3 variables is O(e/log n). A simple adaptation of
the proof in [AL93] shows that the functions they construct also enjoy this prop-
erty. For completeness, we briefly outline their construction adapted to the case we
need. We also provide a streamlined proof of one portion of their result.
Theorem 10 (Adapted from [AL93]). There is a sequence of boolean functions
fn on n=1, 2, ... variables, having expectation
1
2+o(1), such that for any c > 2 and
e > 0, for any large enough n, the influence of any set of en/(log n)c variables is
O(e/(log n)c−2). The time to construct such a function deterministically is nO(n
2).
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Proof. For a positive integer b, let n be the smallest multiple of b for which
(1−2−b)
n
b [ ln 2n . Then b=log n−2 log log n+o(1) and (1−2
−b)
n
b \ ln 2n (1−
(ln n)2
n ).
For such a pair b, n, let P be the collection of all partitions of {1, ..., n} into classes
of size b. The collection of sequences P=(P1, ..., Pn) with each P i ¥P is denoted
PF . Defining M to be the collection of all mappings m: {1, ..., n}Q {0, 1}, the
collection of all sequences m=(m1, ..., mn) with each mi ¥M is denoted MF .
Finally, for P ¥PF and m ¥MF , let f=fP, m be the function
f(x1, ..., xn)= L
1 [ i [ n
I
1 [ j [ n/b
L
k ¥ Pij
(xk=mi(k)),
where P ij denotes the jth class of the partition P
i. For convenience, let
f i(x1, ..., xn)= I
1 [ j [ n/b
L
k ¥ Pij
(xk=mi(k)).
Definition 8. A partition P ¥P and a set B … {1, ..., n} are said to match if for
each 1 [ k [ b, the number of classes Pj of P with |B 5 Pj | \ k does not exceed
2k 1n
b
1b
k
21 |B|
n
2k2 .
Notice that if the partition P is selected randomly, then the probability that a
certain Pj contains more than k elements of B is at most (
b
k)(
|B|
n )
k, whence the
expected number of such Pj is at most
n
b (
b
k)(
|B|
n )
k.
The proof proceeds in four steps:
1. For all P, and almost all m, the expectation of fP, m is
1
2+o(1).
2. For almost all P and every set B … {1, ..., n} with |B|=en/(log n)c, the
number of partitions P i in P failing to match B is less than n/(log n)w(1).
3. There is a constant e0 > 0 so that for any partition P i in P and any
mi ¥M, the influence of any set B … {1, ..., n} with |B| [ e0n/(log n)2 on f i is at
most 1n .
4. If P i and B match then the influence of B on f i is O(e/(n(log n)c−2)).
Steps 1 and 3 are exactly Propositions 5.4 and 5.1 of [AL93].
Proof of Step 4 (cf. Proposition 5.2 of [AL93]). Fix f i, given by P i and mi, and
a matching set B. Notice that an assignment to the variables outside of B leaves f i
undetermined only when
1. every P ij not meeting B contains a variable xk for which xk ] mi(k), and
2. for some P ij, meeting B, the assignment completely agrees with mi.
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These two events are independent. The probability of event 1 is at most
(1−2−b)
n
b − |B| [ 1 ln 2
n
21− b |B|n =O 11
n
2 .
Now focus on event 2. For a fixed class P ij with |P
i
j 5 B|=k, the probability that
xs=mi(s) for all s ¥ P ij 0B is 2k−b. Since P i matches B, the probability of event 2 is
bounded above by
C
1 [ k [ b
2k
n
b
Rb
k
S1 |B|
n
2k 2−(b−k)= n
b2b
511+4 |B|
n
2b−16 [ n
b2b
5exp 14 |B| b
n
2−16 .
Recalling that b=log n−2 log log n+o(1), we have b2b \ (1−o(1)) nlog n so that the
above sum is
O 1 e
(log b)c−2
2 . L
Anticipating the proof of step 2, we record Azuma’s inequality for discrete
martingales.
Definition 9. A martingale is a sequence X1, X2, ..., Xn of real valued random
variables for which E[Xi+1 | Xi]=Xi.
Theorem 11 (Azuma’s Inequality [Hoe63, Azu67]). Let X1, ..., Xn be a
martingale with |Xi−Xi−1 | [ 1. Then
Pr[Xn−E[Xn] > l`n] [ e−
l2
2 .
See [AS92, Section 7] for a general discussion of discrete martingales and a proof
of Azuma’s inequality.
Proof of Step 2. For convenience fix a specific partition P i and consider the
uniform probability space on subsets B of {1, ..., n} of size enlogc n . Let Ek be the event
that
|{j: |P ij 5 B| \ k}| \
2kn
b
Rb
k
S1 |B|
n
2k .
Then Pr[P i matches B]=1−Pr[1k Ek] \ 1−;k Pr[Ek]. As observed earlier, the
expected number of Pj containing more than k elements of B is less than
n
b (
b
r)(
|B|
n )
k.
Then, focusing our attention on those k \`log n, an application of Markov’s
inequality shows that Pr[Ek] [ 2−k=(log n)−w(1).
Suppose now that k [`log n. Let X1, ..., Xn be indicator random variables given
by Xp=1 iff p ¥ B. Then define Y1, ..., Ynb −1 so that
Yj=˛1 if |P ij 5 B| \ k,
0 otherwise.
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and set Y=;j Yj. Our goal is to demonstrate strong tail bounds on the random
variable Y. Finally, for 0 [ p [ n define
Zp=E[Y | X1, ..., Xp].
Then Z0=E[Y] is a constant random variable and Zn=Y. Notice that, by defini-
tion, E[Zp+1 | Zp]=Zp, so that these Zp form a martingale. Furthermore,
|Zp+1−Zp | [ 1, the proof for which we defer for a moment. In this case, application
of Azuma’s inequality yields
Pr[Ek] [ Pr 5Y−E[Y] \ (2k−1) 5nb RbkS1 |B|n 2
k66
[ Pr[Zn−E[Zn] \ (2k−1) n1−o(1)]
[ exp 12k−1
4
n1−o(1)2= 1
logw(1) n
,
since the quantity c2
kn
b (
b
k)(
|B|
n )
k is at least n1−o(1).
Then ;k Pr[Ek]=(log n)−w(1), and an application of Markov’s inequality shows
that with probability 1−o(1) the number of P i which do not match B is less than
n(log n)−w(1).
We return to the proof that |Zp+1−Zp | [ 1. It suffices to show that for any
xF=(x1, ..., xp) ¥ {0, 1}p,
|E[Y | Xi=xi(i [ p), Xp+1=1]−E[Y | Xi=xi(i [ p), Xp+1=0]| [ 1. (2)
The only interesting case is when wt(xF) < |B|. We establish (2) by observing that it
holds under further conditioning. In particular, for both conditioned probability
spaces in (2), we think of first choosing a uniformly random set BŒ of |B|−wt(xF)−1
elements from {p+2, ..., n} to add to B. When Xp+1=1, this condition determines
B; when Xp+1=0, the last element of B is a random element from {p+2, ..., n}0BŒ.
Conditioned on any such BŒ, then, the resulting Y’s can differ by at most 1, as we
wanted. L
In [AL93], the above theorem is established for c=2.
A function satisfying the conditions in the theorem can be found in time nO(n
2).
This follows from two observations. First, |PF | [ (n!)n, and |MF |=2n
2
, so the number
of possible functions is nO(n
2). Second, a function can be tested for the desired
property in exponential time. L
5.2. Constant Round Leader Election Protocols
With Theorem 10 in hand, it is not difficult to show that there exist one round
leader election protocols resilient against coalitions of size O(n/(log n)3):
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Lemma 12. There exists a family of functions gn: XnQ [n] so that for any set of
variables B of size en
(log n)3
, the probability that for a random setting of the variables
outside B, there is a completion so that F(xF) ¥ B is O(e). The set X can be taken to be
{0, 1}k, for k=O(log n).
Proof. Consider the probability distribution where each xFi=xi1 · · · xik is selected
independently and uniformly at random in {0, 1}8 log n. Set Yj=fn(x1j, x2j, ..., xnj)
where fn are the functions of Theorem 10. This is a sequence of independent
1
2+o(1) biased bits. To correct the biases, we use von Neumann’s trick [vNe51]:
collecting them into pairs, Z1=(Y1, Y2), Z2=(Y3, Y4), ..., consider the string
N(Z1) N(Z2)...N(Z4 log n) where
N(a, b)=˛1 if a=1, b=0,0 if a=0, b=1,
L if a À b=0,
and L denotes the empty string. Then
Pr[N(Yi, Yi+1)=1]=Pr[N(Yi, Yi+1)=0]=
1
4+o(1).
Applying Chebyshev’s inequality, we see that with probability 1−o(1), this
sequence of independent and unbiased values has length at least Klog nL. When this
sequence is long enough, the first Klog nL bits are used to produce a value v in [n],
which is the value of gn on these xFi. Otherwise gn(xFi)=1. The mapping f from
{0, 1} Klog nL to [n] used to induce v can be chosen so that -B … [n], |f−1(B)| [ 2|B|.
Fix a collection of variables B of size at most en
(log n)3
. Notice that Pr[gn(xF1, ..., xFn)
¥ B] [ 2m(B)+o(1)=o(1). From the bound of Theorem 10, the probability that a
random xFi, i ] B, results in a function which is non-constant on the variables of B
is at most k ·O(e/log n)=O(e), which establishes the lemma.
N.b. It is in fact true that E[fn]=
1
2+o(
1
log n ), so that one can avoid ‘‘correcting’’
the bias of these Yi, resulting in functions gn: {0, 1} log nQ [n]. L
Using this as a base case, the next result gives a k-round leader election protocol
resilient against coalitions of size en
(log(k) n)3
.
Theorem 13. For k ¥N, there is ek > 0 for which there is a k round leader elec-
tion protocol resilient against coalitions of size ekn/(log (k) n)3. This is constructive for
k \ 3.
Proof. The first k−1 rounds are given by the protocol of Lemma 8. The last
round is given by the protocol of Lemma 12. The errors are handled as in
Theorem 9. L
6. OPEN QUESTION
An outstanding open question is whether there exists a constant round leader
election protocol resilient against linear-sized coalitions. It is unknown even
whether there is such a one round protocol.
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